- Beijing’s diplomatic rhetoric advocates upholding international rules and norms, but this diverges sharply from both its words to party officials at home and its actions abroad that undermine and violate international laws and institutions.
- Beijing benefits from an international order in which other powers are restrained by rules that it claims are biased and so chooses not to follow. This explains how Foreign Minister Wang Yi can both promise to “safeguard … the international system with the United Nations at its core” and reject inconvenient international rulings as “a political circus dressed up as a legal action.”
- Polls suggest Beijing’s rhetoric is resonating with other countries, as Beijing offers itself as a new partner of choice to provide stability in an uncertain world. Its actions instead suggest it intends to divide democracies and create more freedom of action for Beijing.
Archived article
“We are ready to work with the international community, including Australia, to safeguard the victory in the Second World War and the international system with the United Nations at its core,” said Wang Yi (王毅), foreign minister of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong on February 21 [...] This is the latest statement over many years in which the PRC presents its foreign policy as reinforcing the international order that the United States and Europe claimed to uphold.
However, Beijing’s status quo language belies the fundamental changes to the international order that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been pursuing. Beijing has benefited enormously from the international system to date, but especially when other powers are restrained by rules it claims are biased and so chooses not to follow.
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Since early 2017, Beijing has presented the PRC as a responsible power that upholds the status quo of the old international order. That message has often come from the very top. [...] For example, Xi Jinping told the World Economics Forum in January 2017 that “We should adhere to multilateralism to uphold the authority and efficacy of multilateral institutions. We should honor promises and abide by rules.”
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Later, Wang Yi told the China-France Strategic Dialogue “China adheres to multilateralism and supports the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core” (FMPRC, January 24, 2019). The refrain has continued to the present day. Last fall, Xi criticized European tariffs on electric vehicles at the 19th G20 Summit, saying, “We should press ahead with reforming the World Trade Organization (WTO) [and] oppose unilateralism and protectionism … It is important to avoid politicizing economic issues, avoid fragmenting the global market, and avoid taking protectionist moves in the name of green and low-carbon development."
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These words from the CCP leadership may be soothing to the outside world, but they diverge sharply from internally oriented words for the Party faithful that emphasize struggle and change [...]. Here and with select partners, Xi has been clear for years about his desire to change the international system. In his first international trip as CCP general secretary in 2013, Xi told a Russian audience about the need for a “New Type of International Relations” that amounts to a fundamental restructuring of the values embedded in international institutions and the application of the CCP’s so-called “consultative democracy” on a global scale [...]. More recently, Xi’s speech at a study session of the Central Committee in 2023—which was reprinted in the 2025 New Year’s issue of Qiushi, the Party’s theory journal—repeatedly noted the challenge that the PRC’s development constitutes to the Western-centric order.
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This divergence in rhetoric suggests that the words of CCP leaders should not be taken at face value and that instead Beijing should be judged by its actions. However, there, too, it has consistently violated rules and norms that do not align with its preferences.
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One notable example of Beijing’s claim to uphold international law is in the South China Sea. In 2002, Beijing entered into a non-binding agreement, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations. This committed the parties to “universally recognized principles of international law” and noted “their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight above the South China Sea” per the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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Beijing’s behavior gives lie to these commitments. In 2016, a Tribunal [...] found unanimously in the Philippines favor that the PRC had breached its obligations under no fewer than 16 articles of the Convention, was often “aware of, tolerated, protected, and failed to prevent” harmful activities, and “has not cooperated or coordinated with the other States bordering the South China Sea” to attempt to resolve them.
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In 2024, the spokesperson for the PRC Embassy in Manila responded to a question about the ruling, characterizing is as “essentially a political circus dressed up as a legal action … China does not accept or recognize it, and will never accept any claim or action thereon”.
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Last year, the PRC Coast Guard escalated the confrontation with Philippine counterparts, leading to physical ship-to-ship altercations in which at least 8 sailors were injured powerful water cannons to damage Philippines supply ships [...] The PRC has claimed areas like the sea around Second Thomas Shoal where these clashes took place as its own territorial waters. As such, it argues that freedom of navigation does not apply and that the Coast Guard can engage in so-called domestic law enforcement operations. Such aggressive and dangerous operations have continued in 2025 and remain in violation of international law (YouTube/Associated Press, February 1).
Other examples also reveal Beijing’s commitment to international order and global governance as a cynical effort to exploit the rules. In reality, its policies have capitalized on the restraint of other countries in areas like trade and international law. For instance, Wang Yi’s discussion of international cooperation in the auto sector is undermined by the PRC’s predatory, brute-force economics that have long been antithetical to the trading order.
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Additionally, the PRC has used the World Bank to legitimize its mass repression in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region through vocational programs.
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Beijing’s ostensible support for international rules and institutions that restrain the United States and European powers will continue to be a theme as long as the CCP leadership sees that the narrative has traction. Concerns about the Trump Administration’s inconsistency make the CCP’s status quo narrative seem soothing. However, American and European governments should not mistake these narratives for anything other than a wedge to divide democracies and create more freedom of action for Beijing.
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